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TOO MANY PROBABILITIES:





Judges and lawyers first encountering statistical evidence want to believe
that scientific standards are tougher than legal standards.  A court will reject an
assumption that there is no causal connection between an act and an injury if
the evidence makes causation “more likely than not.”  A scientist will reject an
assumption that there is no relationship between two variables only if there is
less than a five percent probability that the statistical evidence showing a rela-
tionship is due to chance.  The law appears willing to accept no more than a
forty-nine percent chance of error while science appears willing to accept no
more than a five percent chance of error.  This perception is incorrect, but hard
to change.  It is a matter of such serious concern to statisticians and scientists
that they often raise the issue, but lay people seldom understand it.  This article
offers those uninitiated into the statistical guild several reasons to look behind
the probabilities when evaluating scientific evidence.
The lack of congruity between legal and scientific standards is most egre-
gious when testimony based on statistical/scientific methods is used to prove
causation in tort law.  Medical scientific testimony is often expressed in terms of
two different probabilities.  The first of these estimates the increased probabil-
ity of harm if a person is exposed, for example, to a toxin.  The second is the
probability that the observed relationship is an artifact of the experimental
method, rather than an actual causal relationship between the toxin and the in-
jury.  These two probabilities measure different phenomena, and neither meas-
ures whether causation is more likely than not.  This article demonstrates that
neither probability, taken alone or together, measures whether the “preponder-
ance of the evidence” test is met.
In many cases involving statistical/scientific evidence, probabilistic observa-
tions may be conveniently captured under three headings: the “belief probabil-
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ity,” the “fact probability,”1 and the “sampling error probability.”  The belief
probability relates to evidentiary requirements imposed by the law, and the fact
probability relates to the facts relevant to legal cases.  These two probabilities
are directly related to the civil law evidentiary requirement that the proponent
of a claim must prove that the other’s act is more likely than not a cause of
harm.  By contrast, the sampling error probability is a characteristic of statistical
science.  Appreciating the distinctions among these probabilities facilitates an
understanding of the relationship between the preponderance of the evidence
standard and the probabilities reported by statisticians.
II
THE THREE PROBABILITIES
The belief probability refers to the credibility—the believability—of the
evidence in support of a party’s factual claims.  In tort causation, the belief
probability describes the factfinder’s confidence in a party’s evidence about
cause.  In civil cases, the law requires that the proponent of a fact convince the
factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence.  The factfinder is instructed that
the plaintiff’s claim of causation must be more likely than not true.  Thus, the
belief probability for the proponent’s factual assertion must exceed fifty percent
in civil cases for the proponent’s assertion to be accepted by the factfinder as
true.2
The fact probability describes a separate feature of a party’s evidence re-
lated to cause.  The fact probability is the likelihood that the defendant’s ac-
tions led to the adverse outcome.  A fact probability may be based on, or stated
in terms of, percentages.  For example, when a physician delays his diagnosis of
a patient’s disease, the fact probability measures the percentage point reduc-
tion, due to the defendant physician’s delay, in the plaintiff’s chances of survival
or recovery (or, in general, of obtaining a better outcome than she obtained).  If
the physician’s delayed diagnosis reduced the patient’s chance of recovery from
thirty percent to ten percent, the relevant probabilities are those percentages.
How confident we are that the physician caused a twenty percentage point re-
duction in the probability of survival depends on the strength of the evidence,
which is the belief probability.  We may, for instance, be only forty percent sure
(belief probability) that the reduction is twenty percentage points (fact prob-
ability).  If that were the case, the factfinder would be constrained to conclude
that the preponderance of the evidence test has not been satisfied.
1. See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Sta-
tistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 382-84 (1986) (describing the difference between the fact probabil-
ity and the belief probability); see also Philip Cole, Causality in Epidemiology, Health Policy, and Law,
27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,279, 10,280, 10,284 (1997) (discussing the credibility of scientific evidence in rela-
tion to civil and criminal burdens of proof).
2. Philip Cole describes the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as occupying a position on
the “spectrum of credibility.”  Thus, what the law describes as a party’s burden of persuasion could be
equated to a requirement that the belief in the party’s assertion occupy at least some minimum position
on that spectrum.  See Cole, supra note 1, at 10,280.
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Risk ratios are frequently relied upon to establish fact probabilities.  Risk
ratios measure the percentage change in the incidence of a specified harm, such
as a disease.  A risk ratio compares a background rate, where the stimulus in
question is not present, to the rate that obtains when the stimulus is present.
For example, in a routine tort case alleging that a negligent failure to light a
stairway caused a fall, a risk ratio might compare the incidence of falling down
stairs when the stairs are well-lit to the incidence of falling when the stairs are
unlit.  In a case based on medical/scientific evidence of causation, a risk ratio
might compare the incidence of birth defects when the drug in question is not
taken by the mother to the incidence when the drug is taken.  A risk ratio
greater than one indicates that risks are increased.  For instance, risk ratios of
1.5 and 3 indicate that the stimulus (for example, lack of lighting) increases the
risk of falling by 50% and 200%, respectively.
A correlation or regression coefficient may also be the basis for a fact prob-
ability.  A correlation coefficient measures the mathematical correspondence or
degree of mathematical association between the stimulus and the harm.
Squaring this coefficient allows us to estimate, in percentage terms, the amount
of variation in one variable mathematically accounted for by variation in an-
other.  A regression coefficient also measures the association between those
variables but adds to the information provided by the correlation coefficient.  It
estimates how much the harm varies when the amount of stimulus is changed.
A regression coefficient may indicate the percentage increase in the incidence
of injuries associated with a specified dosage of stimulus.
The numerical value of any of these fact probabilities is supposed to depend
only on the actual (biological, physical, chemical, or “natural”) connection be-
tween the events in the population being studied.  The fact probability from a
poorly conducted study will reflect that population poorly and will lack credi-
bility.  The confidence that the estimate given by a study or a statistical analysis
is correct, known as the belief probability, is a characteristic of the scientific
method as applied to the sample of the population.
The sampling error probability refers to a statistical property of data un-
derlying evidence offered to prove a relevant fact, such as the connection be-
tween the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s harm.  Statistics used to prove cau-
sation are typically derived from a study of the relationship between acts like
the defendant’s and harms like the plaintiff’s.  Such a study is typically based on
a sample, because of the literal and practical impossibility of measuring the ef-
fect of that act on all living human beings.  Studying only a sample inevitably
gives rise to the possibility that the sample chosen is atypical of a larger group,
the population represented by the sample.
Even when a sample is composed of randomly chosen subjects, those sub-
jects may not represent accurately the population.  That possibility means that
any observed statistical relationship between acts like the defendant’s and
harms like the plaintiff’s revealed by a study of a sample may be due to the
happenstance of having drawn randomly an atypical sample.  Thus, the sam-
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pling error probability measures the likelihood that an observed statistical rela-
tionship was due to the random selection of subjects to include in the study.  If
statistical evidence based on a sample is used to establish a fact probability, the
statistical evidence concerning the fact probability always has an associated
sampling error probability.  An example of how we evaluate the sampling error
in ordinary discourse may facilitate an understanding of the concept.
III
“MALE ANSWER SYNDROME” EVIDENCE:  SAMPLING AND
OTHER SOURCES OF ERROR
An analogy to an imaginary psychological disorder, “Male Answer Syn-
drome,” may promote an intuitive appreciation of the differences among these
three probabilities.  “Male Answer Syndrome” (“M.A.S.”) describes a subject’s
exaggerated willingness to answer (or inability to resist the impulse to answer)
factual questions regardless of the subject’s lack of knowledge of the relevant
phenomena or circumstances.  Thought to be behaviorally related to the exag-
gerated unwillingness to ask for directions when lost, M.A.S. is most commonly
observed in the behavior of males of the human species, lawyers, and peda-
gogues in all disciplines.  A single response by an individual suffering from
M.A.S. illustrates the differences among fact, belief, and sampling error prob-
abilities.
The sampling error probability helps us to evaluate the M.A.S. victim’s re-
sponse to a question.  Consider the following question demanded (perhaps even
rhetorically) of one afflicted with M.A.S.:  Why is the train so late?  The re-
spondent may have some data that he thinks are relevant to the question.  The
sampling error probability assumes without question that the data are relevant.
To calculate this probability, a statistician does not ask where the data origi-
nated, but rather how much data there are and how internally consistent they
are.  The sampling error probability depends on the sample size (“how much
data”) and the variation within the data on the relevant quantified variable of
interest (the “internal consistency”).
A prudent person who questions the M.A.S. victim will want to consider the
range of experiences the respondent brings to bear on his analysis.  Returning
to the train question, if the speaker’s experiences with late trains have been few
and at odds with one another (such as one late train due to a fire the first time
and due to rush hour congestion the only other time), the prudent questioner
will conclude that the factual response should be evaluated skeptically, because
the sample is small and the observations are quite different from one another.
Thus, whatever fact is asserted, the sampling error makes a prudent factfinder
question the assertion.  The sampling error affects the credibility of the asser-
tion, which is the belief probability.
Someone listening to the M.A.S. victim will, however, want to know more
than only the sample size and the variation before deciding whether to believe
the speaker.  It is a characteristic of the syndrome that, despite the lack of sub-
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stantial evidence, the responding M.A.S. sufferer has an answer:  “Rush hour
crowds are causing the delay”; or, if he is a pedant, “There is an eighty-five per-
cent chance that rush hour crowds are the cause.”  The fact probability in this
example is eighty-five percent.  Is it more likely than not that rush hour crowds
are the cause of the delay?  Yes, if we believe the respondent.  Do we?  The
sample error probability tells us something—but not everything—we need to
know about whether we should believe the respondent.  The fact probability
alone tells us nothing at all about the likelihood that the answer is correct.
The preponderance of the evidence test for causation in torts has substan-
tive and procedural components.  The substantive component comes from the
law of causation, which requires that the stimulus be a necessary event in the
chain of causation that resulted in harm.  A stimulus is a “but for” cause in torts
if the harm would not have occurred absent the stimulus.  In cases involving
harmful drugs and other toxic agents, the type of harm suffered by the com-
plainant may occur even if the stimulus is not present.  The substantive issue in
the complainant’s case is whether the stimulus was present and was necessary to
produce the harm.
By contrast, the procedural component of the preponderance of the evi-
dence test describes how convincing the proponent’s evidence of “necessity”
must be.  It only requires that the proponent’s claim that the stimulus was a
necessary antecedent event is more likely than not true.  If the evidence is not
persuasive enough to make the fact more likely than not true, the procedural
effect is that the proponent has failed to prove his claim.  The procedural com-
ponent describes the weight or credibility of the evidence—its believability—
not the substance of what the evidence demonstrates.3  Both components must
3. Thus, in loss-of-a-chance cases, where there is no dispute regarding the cause of death, a defen-
dant may not claim that there was a 70% chance that the patient would have died anyway and argue
that recovery should be denied because “more likely than not” she would have died anyway.  The 70%
figure is a fact probability.  The “more likely than not” test refers to the belief probability, which is the
credibility of the 70% figure.  Thus, the belief probability is not necessarily the 70% claimed by the de-
fendant.
The basic confusion of fact probabilities and belief probabilities in loss-of-a-chance cases is illus-
trated by Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center.  In Fennell, Maryland’s highest court stated:
[T]raditional tort law is based on probabilities.  If a patient had a 49% chance of dying from
an injury or disease and if the patient was negligently treated and dies, full recovery will be
permitted because, absent the negligence, it was more likely than not that the patient would
have survived.  Based on the 51% probability of surviving the injury or disease, we exclude
the injury or disease as the cause of death.  Damages are not reduced by the fact that there
was a strong possibility that the patient would have died absent the negligence.  Conversely, if
the patient had a 51% chance of dying from an injury or disease, and was negligently treated
and died, it was probably the pre-existing medical condition, not the negligence, that killed the
patient, and there is no recovery.  Damages must be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.  Damages are not proven when it is more likely than not that death was caused by the
antecedent disease or injury rather than the negligence of the physician.
580 A.2d 206, 214 (Md. 1990).  The Fennell court also stated:
We are unwilling to relax traditional rules of causation and create a new tort allowing full re-
covery for causing death by causing a loss of less than 50% chance of survival.  In order to
demonstrate proximate cause, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that “it is more probable than not that defendant’s act caused his injury.”
Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
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be evaluated in any analysis of scientific evidence of causation.  Thus, fact prob-
abilities alone—whether risk ratios, correlations, regression results, or other sta-
tistical estimates—may not be considered without an accompanying measure of
the belief probability.  The sampling error probability does not measure the be-
lief probability because there are so many sources of potential error other than
the unrepresentativeness of the sample.
For our M.A.S. victim, the belief probability is, by definition, low.  That
does not mean he is wrong.  It only means that we are highly uncertain that he
is right.  He responds that the train will be late due to rush hour crowds despite
the small number of times he has ridden the trains and the conflicting experi-
ences he has had on the trains, problems the sampling error probability is de-
signed to address in scientific studies.
He also responds despite his inability to do more than guess at the causes in
those cases where the train was late, his inability to know if there were other
factors (such as weather or labor shortages affecting the schedule), his lack of
aptitude for reasoned analysis, and his inability to extrapolate from his experi-
ence on subways to a conclusion about commuter rails generally or about this
particular train.  Each of these sources of potential error should lessen our con-
fidence in the eighty-five percent figure he asserts.  When evaluating statistical
evidence, as when evaluating the responses of a M.A.S. victim, we have no sci-
entific way to adjust this eighty-five percent fact probability to reflect these ad-
ditional uncertainties.  We cannot know whether the fact probability is believ-
able enough to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.  All we know
is that our belief probability is below 100%.
Whether the uncertainties inherent in the statement of a fact reduce our be-
lief probability below that required by the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard cannot be objectively measured.  We can say, however, that the belief
probability is not measured by either the fact probability or the sampling error
probability.  The fact probability is a statement about the event, not about the
credibility of the person or study reporting the event.  The sampling error prob-
ability is a statement about the sample size and variation within the data.  The
number and variety of observations are two sources of uncertainty about the
conclusion that affect the belief probability, but the sampling error probability
in no way accounts for non-random selection of data, nonquantifiability of ob-
There are two probabilities initially involved in this case.  The belief probability is reflected in the
preponderance of the evidence rule requiring that the greater weight of the evidence regarding causa-
tion support the plaintiff’s claim.  The plaintiff’s claim is based on the fact probability that the improper
intubation, rather than the disease, caused the death.  The preponderance of the evidence rule requires
that the plaintiff’s version of the facts are “more likely than not” true, whatever those facts are.  The
Fennell court assumed (that is, treated the belief probability as 100%) that the defendant’s act caused
the death; the fact is treated as known. The court denied recovery, however, because the plaintiff’s
likelihood of surviving meningitis was reduced from 40% to 0%.  Whatever policy reasons there may be
for denying recovery for that loss, it cannot be based on either too low a belief probability (it was as-
sumed to be 100%) or the fact probability (without the physician’s act, the patient would not have died
when she did).  The denial cannot be based on the preponderance of the evidence rule as it relates to
causation.  If some other policy—related perhaps to the fact that the patient did not have long to live
anyway—should limit the amount of damages the plaintiff should recover, then that is another issue.
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servations, improper exclusion of relevant variables, or the difficulties in gener-
alizing from samples or particularizing from generalities.
Notwithstanding the fervent wishes of courts, advocates, and expert wit-
nesses, none of these three probabilities is equivalent to the probability that the
defendant’s act caused the plaintiff’s harm.  Nor do other measures commonly
employed, such as risk ratios, produce numbers equivalent to the probability of
causation.  The following section describes how statistical evidence compares to
the information we would ideally possess when determining causation.
IV
WHAT STATISTICS CONCEAL
Statisticians study the mathematical relationships among variables, while
tort lawyers are interested in the causal relationships among variables.  Both
might be concerned, for example, with the relationship between the way some
people act and the harm other people suffer.  A particular kind of conduct may
be associated (mathematically or by physical laws) with a particular kind of
harm.  For example, ingestion by mothers of the miscarriage preventative di-
ethylstilbestrol may be associated with cancerous vaginal and cervical growths
in their daughters.  It is well recognized, however, that the fact of mathematical
association between variables does not mean that one is physically related to or
caused by the other.
The statistical conclusion about an association between the two variables re-
fers to the extent to which a mathematical relationship between stimulus and
harm is observed in the data.  A statistical coefficient provides an estimate that
summarizes the nature of the relationship, including characteristics such as the
consistency or strength of the relationship.  The tort law conclusion refers to
whether the harm would have arisen had the act not occurred.  This conclusion
is concerned with the “physics” of the relationship—with what came first, the
chronological connection between an act and a result—rather than just whether
there is a connection or the strength of the connection.  Thus, fundamentally
different tasks confront the statistician and the legal factfinder.
What do statistics reveal about causation?  Tort lawyers would like a sum-
mary statistic—a coefficient—that reveals whether, and the extent to which, a
particular act caused a particular plaintiff’s harm.  Other factors might be rele-
vant as well, but the tort lawyer wants to know whether this act or stimulus is
one of the necessary antecedent events.  This is the “but for” cause question in
torts.  A coefficient summarizes a relationship between two variables by
mathematically summarizing the individual observations in the sample.  It pur-
ports to summarize how the positions of people like the plaintiff are affected by
acts like the defendant’s, but what turns that bare number into sufficiently con-
vincing proof of causation?
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A. Statistical Sampling Error
Even with a perfectly designed study of the sample of a population, it is pos-
sible that the size of the coefficient is due to the happenstance that the individ-
ual subjects of the study, even if randomly chosen, are not representative of the
population.  The control group in a sample may have contained, by chance, a
larger proportion of individuals who are naturally immune to the disease than
the population from which they were randomly drawn.  Alternatively, the sam-
ple may be too small to reflect the diversity within the population from which it
was drawn.
Note that the sampling error is not an error in the design of the sample.  In-
deed, it is not an error attributable to any person.  It is an unavoidable property
of inferential statistics, the process of estimating attributes of a population by
examining a sample.  Statisticians use the “p-value” to measure the sampling er-
ror probability, which is the probability that the observed relationship is due to
the unrepresentative nature of the randomly selected subjects studied, rather
than characteristic of the population from which they were drawn.
Varying between 0 and 1.00, the p-value measures the likelihood that it is
the happenstance of selection of the particular individuals included in the study,
rather than any relationship in the underlying population, that accounts for the
observed relationship.  The calculation depends completely on the size of the
sample and the variation within the sample.  For a given sample size, more
variation usually results in a higher p-value, closer to 1.00.  For a given amount
of variation, a smaller sample size usually results in a higher p-value.  This
makes sense; it is hard to generalize from just a few observations if everything
observed is different.  The higher the p-value, the harder it is to conclude that a
stimulus caused a result.  A p-value closer to zero indicates a smaller probability
that the error results from the sampling, leaving open the possibility that it was
one of the many other sources of error identified below that caused any error in
the estimate.
Statisticians tend to conclude that, if a scientific study is otherwise reliable, a
five percent (a p-value of .05) sampling error probability is sufficiently small to
reject the assumption that there is no relationship between the variables of in-
terest.  There is no magic to the five percent value.4  All we can say for sure is
that if everything else remains constant, as the p-value gets smaller, evidence of
4. The statistical significance of the study’s findings only measures the probability that the ran-
dom selection of subjects explains the observed relationship.  There is no reason why a court should
find a statistically insignificant coefficient at least relevant to the question of cause, except that scien-
tific experts (for whatever historical reasons) do not find it sufficient for their purposes.  It does say
something about causation, even if it is not as persuasive as other evidence.  A p-value of .15, for in-
stance, tells a scientist that there is a 15% probability that it is the selection of the sample’s members
rather than “some other reason” for the observed relationship.  This may be valuable information.
Two reasons for ignoring studies with p-values greater than .05 are that judges do not want juries con-
fused by the subtleties of p-values, or that they are willing to defer to scientists in determining eviden-
tiary standards.
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a relationship gets stronger.5  To that extent, the p-value affects the belief prob-
ability.  A higher p-value (closer to 1.0) reflects an increased probability that
the coefficient’s magnitude is due to the selection of subjects rather than any
underlying relationship.  Thus, the strength of our belief in the factual prob-
ability reflected in the coefficient should decline.6
Part V explains that the sampling error probability is not conceptually the
same as the belief probability.  Before explaining that fundamental difference,
5. Professor David H. Kaye recommends requiring that statisticians provide confidence intervals,
rather than just testifying as to whether the coefficient is statistically significant as a way of emphasizing
that it is the court’s job, and not the statistician’s, to decide what level of proof is required and what the
statistical evidence proves or disproves.  See David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Rele-
vant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1363-64 (1986).  According to Professor Kaye, the source of the .05 sig-
nificance level convention is Sir R.A. Fisher, who wrote:
[I]t is convenient to draw the line at about the level at which we can say, “Either there is
something in the treatment, or a coincidence has occurred such as does not occur more than
once in twenty trials.” . . . If one in twenty does not seem high enough odds, we may, if we pre-
fer it, draw the line at one in fifty (the 2 per cent point), or one in a hundred (the 1 per cent
point).  Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent
point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach that level.  A scientific fact should be
regarded as experimentally established only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to
give this level of significance.
Id. at 1344 (citing R.A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, 33 J. MINISTRY AGRIC. GR.
BRIT. 504 (1926)), quoted in Leonard J. Savage, On Rereading R.A. Fisher, 4 ANNALS STAT. 441, 471
(1976).
6. The legal admissibility of evidence that would not be accepted by scientists raises difficulties for
courts.  The dissent in Hodges v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, 9 F.3d 958,
965 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting), observed that
although the data may not establish a causal relationship to a medical certainty, they may
nonetheless meet the more-likely-than-not standard of the law.  It was error for the special
master to refuse to evaluate Kara Hodges’ death on its particular facts and the available evi-
dence, applying the requisite standard of proof.
This recognizes that statistical evidence is revealing and may shed light on a legal or factual issue even
though it does not meet the standards of science.  Nevertheless, courts are hesitant to admit such evi-
dence coming from experts, because it appears that the experts are speaking outside their area of com-
petence.  Thus, the court in Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996),
stated:
While appellants’ experts acknowledge the lack of statistically significant epidemiological evi-
dence, they rely on certain studies as “suggestive” of a link between EtO exposure and brain
cancer.  “Suggestiveness” is not by the experts’ own admission statistical significance, nor did
the appellants’ experts show why and how mere “suggestiveness” scientifically supports a
causal connection; this basis for their scientific opinion must be rejected.
In an associated footnote, the Allen court quotes Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 235 n.4 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 992 (1996), saying:
Courts should particularly pay close attention when expert witnesses depart from generally
accepted scientific methodologies.  As the Seventh Circuit noted in Braun v. Lorillard Inc.,
“[a] judge or jury is not equipped to evaluate scientific innovations.  If, therefore, an expert
proposes to depart from the generally accepted methodology of his field and embark upon a
sea of scientific uncertainty, the court may appropriately insist that he ground his departure in
demonstrable and scrupulous adherence to the scientist’s creed of meticulous and objective
inquiry.”
Allen, 102 F.3d at 197.
This suggests that the court’s rejection of evidence that is not statistically significant is due to
the rules of evidence restricting experts to testimony based on the usual standards of their own profes-
sions or the court’s own lack of expertise, rather than the perceived uselessness of studies with p-values
greater than .05.
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this article describes other sources of error that may make the sampling error
probability and the fact probability themselves unreliable.  Every study has
other potential sources of error discussed below but will yield a p-value that ig-
nores them.  More important, the calculation of the p-value relies on assump-
tions that are inappropriate when estimating the belief probability.  The
mathematics of calculating sampling error probabilities proceeds unaware of
any other sources of error and as if all underlying assumptions were true.  The
sources of error that arise when those assumptions are not true are described
below.  Each source of error affects the belief probability.
B. Experimental Design and Measurement Error
Before we can conclude anything about the causal connection between the
particular defendant’s act and the particular plaintiff’s harm, we must know
whence the coefficient came.  What was measured?  How was it measured?
The well-known gold standard for experimental design is the randomized, con-
trolled, double-masked study.  As Peterson and Conley’s paper discussing the
Polio Trials demonstrates,7 a study that fails to exhibit any of these three char-
acteristics is not necessarily doomed but contains the potential for creating
useless results.  The significance of each characteristic depends on the type of
study, so an independent evaluation must be made for each type of research.
Courts are aware that samples must be well designed.  The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has held that relying on non-random samples to answer trou-
bling issues of causation when handling aggregated claims in mass torts cases
violates the United States Constitution’s requirement of due process.8  The
court emphasized the need for a proper inferential statistical technique as a
means of ensuring “a sufficient level of confidence” in the results.9  A sampling
error probability may as easily be calculated from a poorly designed study as
from a randomized, controlled, double-masked study.  The credibility of that
probability and any fact probability derived from that study, however, depends
on the quality of the study design.
The poorer the experimental design, the more irrelevant and unreliable are
both fact and sampling error probabilities.  The effect of design error cannot
generally be quantified, though qualitative judgments about the “closeness” of
the study to the ideal may be made and evaluated when deciding how much
credibility to give to the coefficient.  The lack of quantifiability, however, means
the effect of poor design on belief probability, fact probability, and sampling er-
ror probability cannot be measured.  All we can know is that the probability es-
timates are not accurate.  For example, we know that a sampling error prob-
ability of .05 from a study of subjects not randomly chosen does not even
accurately measure the probability that an observed association is not due to
7. See David W. Peterson & John M. Conley, Of Cherries, Fudge, and Onions: Science and Its
Courtroom Perversion, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 217 (Autumn 2001).
8. See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d. 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1997).
9. See id. at 1020.
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chance.  We know that the fact probability is unreliable.  The credibility of
those estimates depends on the quality of the study.
Similarly, the credibility of the estimate, the belief probability, will suffer if
any of the following are true: the measurements were imprecise because of
sloppy work or careless research assistants; inaccurate tools were used (using a
yardstick to measure the diameter of a microscopic cell); the underlying ques-
tion is not readily testable (tests of toxins cannot be performed on people, so
they are performed on rats, which may not respond like people at all);10 the
variable of interest cannot easily be quantified (how much pain did the injured
party suffer, or how bored is a juror listening to an expert witness); or unob-
served phenomena account for the relationship (there may be an apparent rela-
tionship between the number of storks in the sky in September and the number
of births that month, but both may have been caused by an extremely cold
January).  It may be that we can recognize that a study is biased, in the sense
that it systematically errs in one direction, but the study itself does not provide a
measure of how far off the estimate is.11  When calculating the sampling error
probability, none of these uncertainties that affect credibility are taken into ac-
count.  The sampling error probability, then, does not measure the belief prob-
ability.
C. Statistical Modeling Error
Even if the experiment is well designed, the measurements are precise, and
the p-value is low, both the coefficient and the probability of sampling error
may be meaningless.  The values of numbers reflected in the summary statistic
and the p-value are only as accurate as the match between the statistical model
and the underlying phenomenon.  Statistical modeling error affects our confi-
dence in the magnitude of the coefficient and the sample error probability,
thereby affecting both the fact probability (we cannot trust that the coefficient
accurately describes the relationship) and the belief probability (we cannot trust
the p-value to measure the likelihood that the selection of aberrant individuals
for the study, rather than some other explanation, accounts for the apparent
relationship).
Two sources of statistical modeling error involve decisions regarding what
variables interact with the two variables of interest and how all of the variables
relate to one another.  A statistical model makes assumptions about what influ-
ences an outcome and how different variables affect an outcome.  Since our ul-
timate question is exactly that—that is, does the defendant’s act (one of the
variables) affect the plaintiff’s condition—those assumptions are critical.12  Pe-
10. See Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that it
would be improper to generalize about an effect on humans from tests on rats showing that EtO pro-
duced brain cancer because, among other reasons, EtO did not produce brain cancer in mice).
11. See Cole, supra note 1, at 10,281 (discussing bias in experimental design).
12. In Paxton v. Union National Bank, 519 F. Supp. 136, 163 (E.D. Ark. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 688 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1982), plaintiffs offered a coefficient showing that, on average, black bank
employees made $213.35 less than whites.  The associated p-value was .01.  Taking other factors such as
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terson and Conley’s paper also describes how an analyst’s model of behavior
can influence the outcome.13  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has explained,
[a] statistical study is not inadmissible merely because it is unable to exclude all possi-
ble causal factors other than the one of interest.  But a statistical study that fails to
correct for salient explanatory variables, or even to make the most elementary com-
parisons, has no value as causal explanation and is therefore inadmissible in a federal
court.14
Thus, a study with a low sampling error probability may be inadmissible be-
cause its credibility is so low.  There are statistical tools to aid modeling, but the
lesson is that a coefficient ought not to be taken at face value even if the ex-
periment is well designed.
To the extent that the statistical model incorrectly describes the underlying
relationships, both the coefficient (the basis for the fact probability) and the
sampling error probability are less accurate.  We should correspondingly have
less faith in the magnitude of the coefficient or the probability that the estimate
is a result of the selection of individuals for the sample.  Without more informa-
tion, we cannot say whether the estimates are too high or too low.  The added
degree of uncertainty cannot be measured, but our belief probability certainly
should decline.  Again, the mathematical calculations underlying the fact and
sampling error probabilities are blind to the quality of the statistical modeling,
and the p-value does not reflect errors in modeling.  Most importantly, the sam-
pling error probability cannot be used to measure whether the evidence em-
bodied in the fact probability is more likely than not true.
D. Hypothesis Testing Error
Even if (1) there is no error in the design of the experiment or in measuring
the variables of interest, (2) the probability of sampling error is small, and (3)
the statistician fully understands and correctly models the underlying phenom-
ena, the p-value is not a reliable measure of the credibility of the evidence or
the belief probability.  Two additional sources of error involve the choice of
methods for calculating p-values and the failure of statistical methods to detect
relationships that exist.
Hypothesis testing is the process of making assumptions about relationships
and then comparing the assumptions to the data by means of a statistical analy-
sis.  One might, for instance, assume that ingesting a drug is not related to the
incidence of an adverse consequence, then test that assumption by collecting
and analyzing data.  The calculation of a sampling error probability is one
experience and education into account, the defendant’s coefficient was only -$4.19 and had an associ-
ated p-value greater than .50, which demonstrates the significance of model design.
13. See Peterson & Conley, supra note 7, at 213.
14. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., School Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528, 537-38 (7th Cir.
1997) (rejecting study claiming that discrimination caused poor student achievement test performance
without considering the effects of poverty, parental involvement, education level of parents, or other
factors on performance).
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means of considering the assumption in light of the evidence.  A p-value may,
for instance, be based on the assumption that there is no relationship.  When
combined with a factual probability suggesting a relationship, a small p-value
for the coefficient between the drug and the adverse result calls the assumption
into question.
For many problems where a statistician wishes to measure the probability of
sampling error, there is a choice of methods.  Whether or not statisticians gen-
erally agree about the correct way to calculate a p-value in a given case, the
mere appearance of a p-value does not guarantee that the correct choice of
measures was made.15
Furthermore, not all proponents of statistical evidence want to prove that a
relationship exists; some want to prove that it does not.  Should a high p-value
(closer to 1.0) suggest that there is no relationship?  No.  Different statistical
tests differ in their ability or power to detect relationships that exist, and the
power of any statistical test is dramatically affected by the size of the sample
from which the coefficient was calculated.16  A court might accept evidence that
there is no relationship between a stimulus and a harm—no relationship, for in-
stance, between progestins and birth defects.  The hypothesis must be tested
with a methodology with sufficient statistical power to detect a causal relation-
ship if one exists.  In Ambrosini v. Labarraque, the court inferred from the
plaintiff’s expert testimony that “[c]onventionally, in order to be considered
meaningful, negative studies, that is, those which allege the absence of a causal
relationship, must have at least an 80 to 90 percent chance of detecting a causal
link if such a link exists; otherwise, the studies cannot be considered conclu-
sive.”17  This eighty to ninety percent figure measures the power of the test but
bears no relationship to the sampling error probability.  Both the power of the
statistical test and the sampling error probability affect the credibility of scien-
tific testimony regarding cause, the belief probability.
A low-powered test (one that is less able to discern relationships or one
based on a small sample size) may indicate no relationship even where there is
one.  Low power will affect the credibility of the proponent’s evidence; this is
yet another reason why the belief probability is divorced from the sampling er-
ror probability.  There is no neat mathematical adjustment to the p-value to re-
flect the inability of the test to capture a relationship.
The ideas of power and statistical significance are complementary.  Lack of
power is one of many reasons a study might fail to find a relationship even
though there is one.  High sampling error is one reason a study might have “re-
vealed” a relationship even though none exists.  While the p-value measures the
probability of finding a relationship where there is none because of the random
15. See infra Part V (illustrating the results of applying alternative methods of calculating p-
values).
16. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 1357-62 (discussing power functions).
17. 101 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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composition of the study, power refers to the probability of not finding a rela-
tionship when one exists because of the limitations of the statistical test.
E. Extrapolation Error
Even if no disconnect results from any of the considerations identified
above, the sampling error probability would be divorced from the belief prob-
ability just where we need it—where we ask whether the particular defendant’s
act was a necessary event in producing the particular plaintiff’s harm.18  The p-
values from scientific/medical studies are based on general observations, not
observations of the plaintiff.  It is based on acts like the defendant’s, not the de-
fendant’s act.  It remains to be proven that what is a possible, even a probable,
cause in general actually was a cause in this case.  This is the problem of infer-
ring specific causation from general causation.  The p-value does not measure
the probability that extrapolation is logical or permissible.
The article in this issue by Professors Freedman and Stark illustrates the dif-
ficulties of extrapolating from scientific/medical evidence.19  In particular, they
discuss why general observations may not apply to specific individuals who are
atypical of the general population studied.  This extrapolation error is distinct
from the sampling error, which results from studying a sample that is different
from the general population.  In a torts case, the plaintiff may be different from
both the sample and the general population.  Because the p-value describes
only the relationship between the sample and the general population, it says
nothing about the applicability of the study to the plaintiff.
Statistical analysis of well-designed scientific/medical studies focuses on the
probability that “chance,” the possible unrepresentativeness of the sample, ac-
counts for an observed relationship between treatment and outcome.  The “but
for” cause in torts is concerned with the likelihood that the outcome can be ex-
plained by “not chance,” the probability that the treatment accounts for the
outcome.  The belief probability also relates to “not chance” rather than the
probability of “chance.”  Since the treatment is only one of the “not chance”
explanations for the harm, the probability of “chance” has nothing to do with
the probability that the treatment is the correct “not chance” explanation.  Per-
fect or ideal experimental design eliminates the possibility of “not chance” ex-
planations other than the variable of interest influencing the outcome.  The p-
value does not measure the probability that the design was perfect; rather, it as-
sumes the design was perfect.  A factfinder must evaluate the characteristics of
design and testing described earlier in this Part.  Doing so, however, does not
eliminate the possibility that the plaintiff in a particular case is different from
18. In Cipolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 561 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
505 U.S. 504 (1992), the court held that the but for cause test did not necessarily mean that there was a
50% chance that the defendant’s conduct caused the harm.  Rather, the test was whether, more likely
than not, the act was a necessary part of the chain of events.
19. See David A. Freedman & Philip B. Stark, The Swine Flu Vaccine and Guillain-Barré Syn-
drome: A Case Study in Relative Risk and Specific Causation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49
(Autumn 2001).
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the subjects sampled.  The ideal of testing only subjects identical in all ways to
the plaintiff is difficult, if not impossible, in practice.20
F. Risk Ratios and the Preponderance of the Evidence Rule
Risk ratios, a measure used by epidemiologists in their study of causation,
suffer from the same problems as other coefficients.  A risk ratio varies between
zero and infinity, higher ratios reflecting increased probability of a risk materi-
alizing as a result of exposure to acts like the defendant’s.  A risk ratio of two,
for instance, indicates that the probability of an adverse outcome doubles when
people are exposed to the stimulus in question.  A risk ratio of two is treated as
a magical threshold because it is interpreted to mean that the exposure causes
as many occurrences of the adverse outcome as background conditions cause.
If the risk ratio is greater than two, some conclude, the preponderance of the
evidence test is met—the risk is more likely than not caused by the exposure.
This reasoning erroneously either ignores belief probabilities or conflates the
fact and belief probabilities.
The risk ratio should be treated as related to the fact probability rather than
the belief probability.  It describes a fact, a numerical summary of the relation-
ship between exposure and risk akin to the ideal coefficient the lawyer seeks.
But there is nothing in that number that describes its credibility.  Risk ratios
are, however, likely to be based on a coefficient for which the sampling error
probability has been or can be calculated.  One might suspect that a combina-
tion of a p-value and a risk ratio would provide something akin to the belief
probability.  For all of the reasons described above, neither the sampling error
probability, nor the fact probability, nor the two combined, measure the belief
probability.
The risk ratio and the sampling error are only the start of an inquiry into the
reliability of scientific evidence.  Only if the fact probability is sufficiently high
so that the risk ratio is greater than two, the fact probability is based on a study
with a p-value that is sufficiently low, and the fact probability is based on a
study meeting all of the additional challenges discussed above, can one begin to
infer that there is a relationship between treatment and outcome.  One would
still not have a measure of the belief probability.
Courts look for studies with low sampling error probabilities and high fac-
tual probabilities (high risk ratios), citing those two criteria as the basis for es-
tablishing a credible case of causation.21  Neither bears any necessary relation-
20. Freedman & Stark, supra note 19, illustrate the difficulty of concluding that treatment with flu
vaccine caused the plaintiff in Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D. Mo. 1986), aff’d in part,
remanded in part, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987), to suffer from Guillain-Barré syndrome.  Their discus-
sion identifies several factors leading to different rates of adverse outcomes for different people, in-
cluding the age and health of the vaccinated individual.
21. Cf. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 347 n.49 (1999)
(“Some judges have improperly blurred the two very distinct concepts of relative risk and statistical
significance by labeling the results of epidemiological studies which derived a relative risk of less than
2.0 as ‘statistically insignificant.’”).  As an example, Finley cites In re Joint Eastern and Southern District
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ship to credibility.  In Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.,22 the court reviewed
the district court’s treatment of a study that showed a statistically significant
correlation between silicone and increased antinuclear antibodies and a relative
risk of 1.24.  The district court concluded that the risk ratio of 1.24 was “so sig-
nificantly close to 1.0” that the study was not worth serious consideration for
proving causation.23
It is strange but true that a perfectly credible study may not be worth serious
consideration.  Imagine that one can be perfectly confident that 1.24 is a precise
and accurate description of the increased risk of an adverse outcome resulting
from treatment for the specific plaintiff.  This evidence provides a sound basis
for inferring that there is a causal connection but is not strong enough evidence.
We are “confident,” so the 1.24 figure is credible, and the belief probability is
high.  It is a precise estimate, so the sampling error is small.  The problem is that
the fact probability, while credible, is too small.  To prove but-for causation by a
preponderance of the evidence, both the belief and fact probabilities must be
taken together.
The court in Allison recognized that a relative risk of 2.0 permits an infer-
ence that the plaintiff’s disease was as likely as not caused by the agent, because
it implies a fifty percent likelihood that the agent caused the disease. 24  Based on
the probabilities represented in a relative risk of 2.0, if they are true, the treat-
ment is as likely to have caused the outcome as all other causes combined.  A
risk ratio greater than two makes the treatment more likely than not a but for
cause.  Under a standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., “plaintiffs’ experts would have had to testify either that
Bendectin actually caused plaintiffs’ injuries (which they could not say) or that
Bendectin more than doubled the likelihood of limb reduction birth defects
(which they did not say).”25  Plaintiffs must offer “either specific evidence that
the drug actually caused their injuries or epidemiological proof that the drug
‘more than doubles’ the risk of birth defects because epidemiological evidence
presents statistical likelihoods rather than direct information about the cause of
Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1041-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d, 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995),
which describes epidemiological studies that yielded relative risks between 1.0 and 1.5 as “statistically
insignificant.”  See also Charles Tomljanovic et al., Anthropogenic Electromagnetic Fields and Cancer:
A Perspective, 8 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 287, 290 (1997) (stating that “[a] relative risk ratio of
2.0 or more may be considered a strong, statistically significant association between exposure and dis-
ease, and supports a causal relationship”).
22. 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
23. Id.  Causation can logically be established even if the risk ratio is less than two if there is par-
ticularized evidence, such as tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination.  Risk ratios, like
other statistical tests, are only as believable as the underlying design, which includes the testability of
the causal link.  It may be the inherent difficulty of epidemiology, rather than the lack of a causal rela-
tionship, that is responsible for the lack of epidemiological evidence.
24. See id. at 1315 n.16 (citing REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-69 (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1994)).
25. 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
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birth defects for the particular plaintiff.”26  The relative risk permits such an in-
ference only if it is credible, which means that the belief probability is greater
than fifty percent.  The preponderance of the evidence standard is not met
without a belief probability greater than fifty percent and a risk ratio greater
than 2.0.
Risk ratios suffer from the same extrapolation problems as other coeffi-
cients and do not help courts avoid the difficulties presented by statistical sci-
ence.  These difficulties are not unknown to epidemiologists or medical science.
Establishing a statistical relationship between the stimulus and the response—
the act and the harm—is the first step in an epidemiologist’s search for
causation.  An epidemiologist then looks to see whether there is “consistency in
the findings of multiple scientific studies [to eliminate some of the sources of
error mentioned above], biologic [sic] plausibility, the time sequence of the
prospective cause and effect, the quantitative strength of the association, and
the specificity with which the two phenomenon [sic] correlate.”27  When looking
for the cause of a particular individual’s harm, it would be most desirable to
have an individualized risk ratio, because risk ratios are different for different
groups of people.  The lack of data for different groups of people enhances the
difficulties inherent in extrapolation, reducing the belief probability associated
with the fact probability based on a risk ratio.28
V
A FUNDAMENTAL DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
AND THE SAMPLING ERROR
It is easy to be misled by many discussions of the role of statistical evidence.
Consider an excerpt from one discussion of the scientific method.  In this dis-
cussion, the author repeats the notion that statistical significance is the only test
for reliability of scientific evidence:
The legal “preponderance of the evidence” standard has nothing to do with assessing
whether data is scientifically reliable.  Since Daubert seeks to exclude scientifically un-
reliable evidence, the scientific evidence must conform to the accepted convention of
95 percent probability to be admissible.  Once all scientifically reliable evidence (that
is, that meeting the 95 percent threshold) is introduced, the fact finder will determine
by the preponderance of all admissible scientifically reliable evidence, whether the
plaintiff has met the burden of proof.29
26. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 135 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the standard
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Daubert).
27. Id. at 136.
28. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321 n.16 (discussing how a risk ratio less than two could be combined
with other evidence to show causation); see also Mark Parascandola, What is Wrong with the Probability
of Causation?, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 29, 35-36 (1998) (explaining why risk ratios should be based on plain-
tiffs’ particularized probability of causation and how there is no necessary relationship between the size
of the risk ratio (fact probability) and the strength of the evidence (belief probability)).
29. Bruce R. Parker, Effective Strategies for Closing the Door on Junk Science Experts, 65 DEF.
COUNS. J. 338, 347 (1998).
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A reader of this excerpt from and article by Bruce Parker might believe that
all statistically significant evidence is scientifically reliable, though the previous
section has demonstrated that this is not true.  It would be easy to cite Parker’s
article as authority for the proposition that scientific evidence is reliable if it is
statistically significant, even though elsewhere Parker reveals his awareness that
the fact of statistical significance does not mean that a study’s results are “good
scientific evidence.”30  Parker observed that the study from which the p-value
was calculated might have been poorly designed or controlled.31  He was also
aware that even statistically significant results from a well-controlled study may
have no biological significance.32  The previous sections have illustrated not only
that there is no magical significance to the .05 p-value (translated in the ex-
cerpted text into a ninety-five percent threshold), but that reliability depends on
much more than statistical significance.33
There is no convenient way to translate the .05 p-value into a ninety-five-
percent confidence that the fact probability is correct, credible, believable, or
true.  There is a fundamental disconnect between what factfinders want to know
and the information a statistical study provides.  In theoretical discussions of the
use of statistical evidence in legal proof, it is well recognized that statistical sig-
nificance is not the same as the civil burden of proof.
Consider again the but for cause test and the sampling error probability.
The but for cause test in civil cases requires the factfinder to determine the
probability that the treatment caused the outcome.  In scientific/medical cases,
that is the plaintiff’s assertion or hypothesis.  In mathematical terms, the plain-
tiff bears the burden of showing that the probability P of the hypothesis H be-
ing true, given the evidence E, is greater than fifty percent, that is, plaintiff must
demonstrate that p(H E) > .50.
While the plaintiff must prove that the hypothesis is (more likely than not)
true, the p-value assumes that the hypothesis is true.  The p-value measures the
probability of finding such evidence E if H is true.  For a statistical result to be
statistically significant by conventional standards, a scientist must show that the
sampling error probability is less than .05, that is, the scientist must demonstrate




33. It is not difficult to find quotations that misrepresent the test for reliability of scientific evi-
dence.  This is not necessarily because commentators are unaware of the limits of statistical science.
Rather, scholarly commentators and courts are often considering only a piece of the statistical puzzle.
As the previous section illustrated, this is quite common in discussions of the relationship between risk
ratios and statistical significance.  See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Karns, Statistical Misperceptions, FED. LAW.,
June 2000, at 19, 21 (focusing on the importance of statistical significance when evaluating risk ratios
and discussing how statistically significant risk ratios less than two may still be worth a court’s consid-
eration); see also Finley, supra note 21.  The rest of the picture is the credibility of both of those num-
bers.  See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and
Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1102 n.327 (1999) (discussing how more goes into the
validity calculus when evaluating the legal admissibility of expert testimony than either relative risk or
statistical significance).
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is true, it does not measure whether it is true.  Significance testing begs the
questions courts need ultimately to answer.
The closest any mathematical approach has come to translating p-values
into belief probabilities is Bayes Theorem.34  Bayes Theorem specifies the addi-
tional information needed to translate something like a p-value into the likeli-
hood that a hypothesis is true given the evidence.35  Bayes Theorem states that
the likelihood that the hypothesis is true depends on the sampling error,
p(E H), the probability that the hypothesis is generally true without regard to
the particular evidence, p(H), and the probability of occurrence of evidence
such as that observed given the probability that the hypothesis is true:36 p(H E)
= [p(H)  p(E H)]  p(E).  To translate the p-value into a measure of the like-
lihood that the treatment caused the outcome, the factfinder needs to know, a
priori, the probability that the hypothesis is true, p(H).  Then the factfinder
needs to calculate the likelihood of finding such evidence given that probability.
This information is missing from medical/scientific studies of tort causation.
Statistical science has, at this point, provided all the information it can.
Where statistical science ends its inquiry, logic must take over.  It is the
proper design and analysis of scientific studies that leads scientists from p-
values to inferences about causation.  Having designed and carefully analyzed
the study, and having discovered that the sampling error is unlikely to explain
the outcome, the logical alternative choice is the treatment.
David Peterson has a favorite story to explain the limits of the sampling er-
ror probability.37  He describes a clown entering a room flipping a coin.  The
clown flips the coin three times, obtaining three tails, then leaves the room.  A
statistician can calculate the probability of obtaining three tails from a sample of
three just by chance if the coin is fair.  That is the p(E H) described above.
Without more information, however—information that is outside the statisti-
cian’s normal province—the statistician cannot say whether the clown’s coin is
fair.  That is the p(H E) above.  If it is fair, the probability of that outcome
arising by chance can be determined.  Whether it is fair is a mystery until we
bring in a metallurgist, a physicist, or perhaps a numismatist.  Unfortunately, we
are particularly interested in whether the “unfairness” of the coin explains the
outcome.
34. An exposition of Bayes Theorem appears in RONALD J. WONNACOTT & THOMAS H.
WONNACOTT, ECONOMETRICS § 10.1, at 198 (1970).
35. In Bayes Theorem, the likelihood of observing such evidence if the hypothesis is true [p(E H)]
corresponds to the p-value if “observing such evidence” means “observing evidence as inconsistent with
or even more inconsistent with the hypothesis as was observed in these data.”
36. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent “Transposition Fallacy”: Why “Statisti-
cally Significant” Evidence of Discrimination May Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 444 n.21
(1998) (applying Bayes Theorem to employment discrimination context); Jonathan J. Koehler & Dan-
iel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic
Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 255 n.27 (1990) (discussing Bayes Theorem).
37. See David Peterson, Judging Science, Lecture at the Duke University School of Law Private
Adjudication Center Symposium (May 24, 2000).
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Whether the coin is fair is analogous to the “but for” cause question in tort
law.  We are interested in comparing alternative explanations for an outcome.
One possibility is that chance, the happenstance of getting three out of three
heads even if the coin is fair, accounts for the result.  Others are that an imbal-
anced (unfairly weighted) coin explains the greater number of tails, or perhaps
an unfair coin-flipping method accounted for the result.  Statistics can tell us the
probability that chance accounts for the result if the coin is fair.  If the sampling
error is small, it suggests that something else—perhaps a weighted coin or per-
haps the unfair flipping—accounts for the result.  We need other experts to es-
tablish what that “something else” is.
Since the “something else” is the relevant question in tort law, it might seem
that statistical science is of little practical utility.  Combined with scientific re-
search design, however, statistical science is very powerful.  The elements of re-
search design eliminate as logical alternative explanations for the observed out-
come all but two explanations: chance (the happenstance of a non-
representative sample) and the explanation of interest (in torts, exposure to the
defendant’s product).  Eliminating confounding explanations in the coin-
flipping example requires designing the experiment so that, if chance is an un-
likely explanation because the sampling error is very small, then an unfair coin
is the only other logical alternative.  Scientific research design in the torts causa-
tion context requires designing product tests so that, if sampling error is un-
likely to explain the harm associated with ingestion of a drug, then it must be
the drug itself.  The sampling error probability does not measure the likelihood
that the experiment has been scientifically designed; it assumes that the design
was flawless and calculates the likelihood that the random selection of subjects
accounts for the outcome.
VI
CONCLUSION
When an experiment has been scientifically designed to eliminate explana-
tions other than the influences of chance and the product in question, statistical
analysis may eliminate chance as an explanation, leaving only the product in
question.  Eliminating chance as a plausible explanation for the outcome is a
sine qua non of drawing a logical conclusion that the product caused the out-
come.  It is naturally tempting to judge reliability of a scientific study by its sta-
tistical significance.  This article has illustrated why the statistical significance
question is only the beginning of the inquiry.  It has identified a number of
other factors relevant to the question of reliability.  If these elements of scien-
tific design and testing are not met, the measure of statistical significance is it-
self meaningless.
The coin-flipping clown example illustrates the errors resulting from im-
proper application of the scientific method.  Experimental design error may ex-
plain the outcome if the clown has learned to flip coins in a way that affects the
outcome.  Even if the clown is not skilled enough to make it land on heads
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every time, starting with the head faced down every time and flipping so that
the coin rotates as few times as possible may affect the outcome, regardless of
whether the coin is fair or not.  The result of experimental error is that the sam-
pling error estimate and the result of three tails are unreliable descriptions of
the coin’s characteristics.  Similarly, if the clown obscures the result of each flip
and merely reports it, his impaired vision, rather than any characteristic of the
coin, may account for the reported result.
Statistical modeling error may account for the low p-value.  It might be that
whether the coin starts its voyage into the air face down or face up makes a sys-
tematic difference in the outcome.  If we incorrectly assume the contrary, then
we are implicitly assuming that the design or weight distribution of the coin (its
“fairness”) is the only relevant explanatory factor.  The simple model that as-
sumes that only one factor influences the outcome may give us unreliable evi-
dence about the coin.  Unless the model is changed, omission of a relevant ex-
planatory factor yields a sampling error based on false assumptions.  The belief
probability depends on the accuracy of the model and on the assumption that
the sampling error is correct.  The further the statistical model departs from re-
ality, the less reliable the sampling error will be.
Hypothesis testing error may account for the low p-value.  The p-value may
be calculated by various methods.  The best test is one designed for the par-
ticular experiment.  Selecting the wrong test might change the p-value.  For ex-
ample, use of the Z-test, which is appropriate for larger samples than this, yields
a p-value of .0416 in this case, while the preferable binomial test yields a p-value
of .125, quite different compared to the .05 significance level.38  The appropriate
test depends on the reason why we are asking the question, the size of the sam-
ple, the process the analyst attempted to model statistically, and the properties
of the underlying population.  The p-value depends on the choice of test.  Using
either the improper test or a low-powered test will yield a misleading p-value
and affect the belief probability.
Extrapolating from the results of the clown’s flipping to the likely results of
other people flipping other coins may lead to inaccurate results if this coin was
unfair (or if the flipping was biased), a fact about which the statistical test has
revealed little.  The more differently other coins are constructed, the less reli-
able are either the fact of eight tails or the resulting sampling error.  The belief
probability suffers accordingly.
Courts cannot avoid evaluating the underlying scientific and statistical
methodology when evaluating scientific evidence of causation.  In particular,
they may not rely on the statistical significance of the study, as measured by the
sampling error probability, to conclude that the evidence is scientifically reliable
38. Similarly, one must choose in many cases between a two-tailed test (which identifies the prob-
ability of getting such an extreme number of heads or tails), or a one-tailed test (which identifies the
probability of this many tails).  The issue of whether a one- or two-tailed test is appropriate arises often
in employment discrimination cases.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing one-tailed and two-tailed tests of statistical significance).
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or whether the preponderance of the evidence test is met.  Nor may they rely on
the sampling error probability in combination with the fact probability.  It is the
belief probability, based only in part on an estimate of the sampling error prob-
ability, that determines whether the fact probability is more likely than not true.
The belief probability also depends, however, on the other indicia of reliability
discussed.
